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Abstract. Competition is a main tenet of economics, and the reason is that a
perfectly competitive equilibrium is Pareto-efficient in the absence of externalities
and public goods. Whether a product is selected in a market crucially relates to
its competitiveness, but the selection in turn affects the landscape of competition.
Such a feedback mechanism has been illustrated in a duopoly model by Lambert
et al., in which a buyer’s satisfaction is updated depending on the freshness of a
purchased product. The probability for buyer n to select seller i is assumed to be
pn,i ∝ e
Sn,i/T , where Sn,i is the buyer’s satisfaction and T is an effective temperature to
introduce stochasticity. If T decreases below a critical point Tc, the system undergoes a
transition from a symmetric phase to an asymmetric one, in which only one of the two
sellers is selected. In this work, we extend the model by incorporating a simple price
system. By considering a greed factor g to control how the satisfaction depends on
the price, we argue the existence of an oscillatory phase in addition to the symmetric
and asymmetric ones in the (T, g) plane, and estimate the phase boundaries through
mean-field approximations. The analytic results show that the market preserves the
inherent symmetry between the sellers for lower T in the presence of the price system,
which is confirmed by our numerical simulations.
PACS numbers: 05.70.Fh,05.10.Ln,89.70.-a
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1. Introduction
Socio-economic systems have attracted attention of physicists due to their inherent
dynamic complexity [1, 2, 3]. Simple interactions between social agents are known to
give rise to non-trivial collective patterns like, e.g., segregation [4, 5, 6], opinion [7, 8, 9]
or language dynamics [10], and crowd behavior [11, 12]. Focusing more specifically on
economic aspects, the interaction of sellers and buyers in a market can be viewed as a
dynamical process. For instance, taking space into account and including transportation
costs in the agents’ utility leads to the well-known Hotelling model [13, 14], in which
stores try to find the optimal location to maximize their profit.
Here we consider a different problem, neglecting spatial aspects but taking into
account a finite lifetime of products, leading to a potentially rich dynamics. Buyers
and sellers change their respective states upon every purchase: Namely, each buyer
evaluates the sellers based on the purchased products, and each buyer also updates the
list of products in stock. Under certain condition, their interaction may form a positive
feedback loop in such a way that a seller, if selected by a buyer, becomes more likely to
be selected in the future. Such a mechanism has been proposed and analyzed in detail
by Lambert et al. [15]: They have considered two sellers dealing with perishable goods,
so that a seller can replace existing products with fresh ones when buyers continuously
make purchases from the seller. As a result of this positive feedback, the symmetry
among the sellers gets broken spontaneously, leading to a virtual monopoly. Lambert
et al. have analytically identified a critical threshold for this phenomenon, when the
control parameter is the degree of randomness in buyers’ choices.
However, their duopoly model in Ref. [15] does not contain any price system, and it
is an interesting question whether the market can restore the symmetry when the sellers
are allowed to charge different prices. If the price declines as time goes by, and if buyers
are sensitive to the price as well as freshness, it is indeed plausible that the market can
better resist the tendency toward a monopoly. We thus extend the model of Ref. [15]
by including a price mechanism, which defines the price of a product as a function of
its freshness, and check to which extent this prescription stabilizes the market.
In this paper, we show that the symmetry is recovered at a lower degree of
randomness in buyers by including a price system coupled to the freshness of perishable
goods. The threshold is estimated on a mean-field level in the sense that we neglect
fluctuations among buyers. We also find the possibility of a third phase, in which
buyers seesaw between the two sellers. The period of this seesaw motion is estimated
approximately by assuming homogeneity of the products in stock. These analytic results
are consistent with a phase diagram obtained numerically.
This work is organized as follow: We explain our model in Sec. 2. In Sec. 3.1,
we analyze its time evolution under the assumption that buyers remember the past for
a long time. The threshold for symmetry breaking is given by examining stationary
states in Sec. 3.2. Section 3.3 explains the origin of the oscillatory phase and gives an
approximate estimate of the period. We briefly discuss implications of our findings in
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Sec. 5 and then conclude this work.
2. Model
Suppose that two sellers are competing to sell products of the same kind. Each seller
has Np products in stock, and each of them has its own age τ . As soon as a product
is sold, it is replaced by a new product with τ = 0 to conserve the number of products
on the market all the time. As in Ref. [15], our assumption is that the products are
perishable, so that the freshness changes with τ in the following functional way:
h(τ) = e−τ/τ1 , (1)
where τ1 is the characteristic time scale for aging. It is a common marketing strategy
to lower the prices of shopsoiled products. We may therefore assume that each seller
can choose a price policy, parametrized by hc: This parameter means the characteristic
freshness for a markdown. If hc is low, the price will not drop down until the product
becomes very old. Specifically, we set
x(h(τ)) = x(τ) = 1− exp
[
−
h(τ)
hc
]
, (2)
which is a decreasing function of τ , bounded between zero and 1− e−h
−1
c . On the other
hand, we have Na buyers. Let n ∈ {1, ..., Na} be an index to denote each buyer. If
buyer n’s satisfaction from the ith seller is denoted by Sn,i, the probability to choose
this seller is given as
pn,i = Z
−1
n e
Sn,i/T , (3)
where T is an effective temperature to control the degree of stochasticity in making the
decision, and Zn ≡ e
Sn,1/T + eSn,2/T is a normalization factor. This formalism is often
called the logistic selection model or logit rule [16], and it bears some analogy with the
Glauber rate in physical systems, if we assume that energy plays the role of negative
satisfaction. Suppose that the buyer n chooses the ith seller to purchase a product
of freshness hn,i for price xn,i at time t. This product updates his or her satisfaction
from this seller and affects the buyer’s next purchase at t′ > t. We assume that the
satisfaction at t′ can be described as
Sn,i(t
′) = αSn,i(t) + (1− α)
{
g
(
1− xtn,i
)
+ (1− g)htn,i
}
, (4)
where α characterizes the buyer’s memory and g is a greed factor to determine the
sensitivity to the price. The superscript t means that the price and freshness are
measured at time t.
3. Analysis
3.1. Time evolution of probabilities
Let us assume that the buyers can be represented by a single average buyer. In other
words, we will neglect fluctuations in the buyers’ satisfaction as well as their behavior
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to drop the buyer index n. Then, the probability to choose the ith seller becomes
pi = Z
−1eSi/T with Z ≡
∑
i e
Si/T . At time t, our average buyer pays x¯ti to purchase a
product of freshness h¯ti from the ith seller. According to Eq. (4), the buyer’s satisfaction
evolves as
Si(t+ τ0) = αSi(t) + (1− α)
{
g
(
1− x¯ti
)
+ (1− g)h¯ti
}
, (5)
where τ0 denotes the average time interval to make a purchase. If the memory decays
very slowly, i.e., 0 < 1− α≪ 1, we may regard Si as a smooth function of t to obtain
S˙i =
1− α
τ0
[
g (1− x¯i) + (1− g)h¯i − Si
]
, (6)
where the dot means the time derivative. Note also that we have suppressed the
superscript t, because Eq. (6) is not a difference equation between t and t + τ0, but
a differential equation at time t. The time evolution of pi can also be expressed as
p˙i =
1
T
S˙i
eSi/T
Z
−
(∑
j
1
T
S˙je
Sj/T
)
eSi/T
Z2
=
1
T
pi
(
S˙i −
1
Z
∑
j
S˙je
Sj/T
)
=
1
T
pi
(
S˙i − 〈S˙〉
)
, (7)
where 〈X〉 =
∑
j pjXj means the average over the sellers. Equation (7) can be
understood as the replicator equation [17, 18, 19], where Eq. (6) plays the role of fitness.
By substituting Eq. (6) into Eq. (7), we find
p˙i =
1− α
τ0T
pi
{[
g(1− x¯i) + (1− g)h¯i − Si]−
〈
g(1− x¯) + (1− g)h¯− S
〉}
=
1− α
τ0T
pi
{[
g(1− x¯i) + (1− g)h¯i − T ln pi]
−
〈
g(1− x¯) + (1− g)h¯− T ln p
〉}
, (8)
where we have used Si = T (ln pi + lnZ).
3.2. Stationary state
We first consider a stationary state in which all pi’s are constant. The average fraction
of products purchased from the ith seller during a time interval (t, t + dt) is expressed
as
λi(t)dt =
Napi
Npτ0
dt, (9)
because the average number of buyers visiting i per unit time is Napi/τ0. The
distribution of product ages τ at the ith seller is denoted as φi(τ, t) with a normalization
condition
∫∞
0
dτφi(τ, t) = 1. The buyer randomly chooses a product, regardless of its
age. The time evolution of φi(τ, t) is thus written as
φi(τ + dt, t+ dt) = φi(τ, t)− [λi(t)dt]φi(τ, t). (10)
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By expanding Eq. (10) to the linear order of dt, we find that
∂φi
∂τ
(τ, t) +
∂φi
∂t
(τ, t) ≈ −λi(t)φi(τ, t). (11)
This equation has a stationary solution φsti (τ) = λie
−λiτ , from which h¯i for the
stationary state is obtained as h¯i =
∫∞
0
dτφsti (τ)h(τ) = 1/ [1 + (λiτ1)
−1]. If we introduce
R ≡ Naτ1
Npτ0
= λiτ1/pi, this result can also be written as
h¯i =
(
1 +
1
Rpi
)−1
. (12)
In addition, the value of x¯i ≡
∫∞
0
dτφsti (τ)x(τ) can be computed from the stationary
distribution as follows:
x¯i =
∫ ∞
0
dτλie
−λiτ
[
1− exp
(
−
e−τ/τ1
hc
)]
. (13)
Let us introduce another variable y ≡ e−τ/τ1h−1c . The change of variables then leads to
x¯i = 1− piRh
piR
c γ
(
piR, h
−1
c
)
, (14)
where γ(s, x) is the lower incomplete gamma function γ(s, x) ≡
∫ x
0
dye−yys−1.
A possible stationary state is such that each seller is chosen with equal probability,
i.e., pi = p0 ≡ 1/2. We will check the stability of such a state under small perturbation
in the following way: First, let us rearrange Eq. (8) as
p˙i =
1− α
τ0T
{
g [pi(1− x¯i)− pi 〈1− x¯〉] + (1− g)
[
pih¯i − pi
〈
h¯
〉]
− T [pi ln pi − pi 〈ln p〉]} . (15)
By adding small perturbation, we change the probabilities to pi = p0+ǫi with
∑
j ǫj = 0.
The expressions inside the square brackets on the right-hand side (RHS) of Eq. (15) can
then be expanded as
pi(1− x¯i)− pi〈1− x¯〉 = F(R, p0, hc)ǫi +O(ǫ
2
i ), (16)
pih¯i − pi
〈
h¯
〉
=
Rp0
(1 +Rp0)2
ǫi +O(ǫ
2
i ), (17)
pi ln pi − pi 〈ln p〉 = ǫi +O(ǫ
2
i ), (18)
with
F(R, p0, hc) =
∂
∂ǫ
{
p0(p0 + ǫ)Rh
(p0+ǫ)R
c γ
[
(p0 + ǫ)R, h
−1
c
]}∣∣∣∣
ǫ=0
. (19)
We note that the zeroth order of ǫi does not exist, so that Eq. (15) can be rewritten to
the linear order of ǫi as
ǫ˙i ≈
1− α
τ0T
{
gF(R, p0, hc) + (1− g)
Rp0
(1 +Rp0)2
− T
}
ǫi. (20)
The unperturbed stationary state is stable when the prefactor of ǫi on the RHS is
negative. In other words, we can observe a symmetric phase, in which pi = 1/2 for
every i, provided that
T > Tc(g) ≡ gF(R, p0, hc) + (1− g)
Rp0
(1 +Rp0)2
, (21)
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for given R and q. One should note that multiple stable states can coexist in some range
of R [15]. If R is small enough, however, we may say that the symmetric state is the
only possibility when T > Tc. The question is what happens when T becomes lower
than Tc. When the greed factor g approaches zero, the above analysis reduces to the
result of Ref. [15], in which an asymmetric phase emerges below Tc(g = 0). The origin
of the asymmetric phase can be explained as follows: If the buyer’s choice gets slightly
biased against a certain seller by chance, the products of this seller get older, which
in turn lowers the probability to choose this seller, forming a positive feedback loop.
In the end, only a single seller occupies the whole market, which is a stable stationary
state at low T . Even if g has a small finite value, it is reasonable to expect the same
spontaneous symmetry-breaking phenomenon. When g gets high enough, however, the
price system comes into play in a nontrivial way as will be explored below.
3.3. Oscillatory phase
Let us rewrite Eq. (6) as
S˙i =
1− α
τ0
[−Si +Qi(τ)] , (22)
by defining Qi(τ) ≡ g[1− x¯i(τ)]+(1−g)h¯i(τ). It implies that we may expect Si ≈ Qi(τ)
when the system is evolving slowly. Suppose that only one seller, say, i = 1, is
selected due to the symmetry-breaking mechanism explained above. This seller is always
equipped with new products, so the satisfaction from this seller will be S1 ≈ Q1(0). On
the other hand, τ increases for the other seller as time t goes by, so S2(t) will follow
the trajectory of Q2(τ). Figure 1 shows two possible cases of Qi(τ), i.e., with small and
large greed factors, respectively. When g is small, Q2(τ > 0) stays below Q1(0), so the
asymmetric phase remains stable [Fig. 1(a)]. On the other hand, if g is large enough,
the low price compensates for the freshness reduction, and Qi(τ) can actually be greater
than Qi(0) when τ exceeds a certain threshold [Fig. 1(b)]. Now, the second seller begins
to be selected, and the situation is less advantageous to the first seller: The value of Q1
decreases, because some products are not sold, which lowers the freshness further. On
the other hand, Q2 does not decrease, because old products make positive contributions
to Q1 due to their low prices while refreshed products also attract buyers. The result is
that the second seller is preferred until the prices of the other seller become low enough.
To sum up, they take turns in playing the role of the champion and the challenger,
which is the origin of the oscillating behavior.
The above argument leads to some quantitative predictions: Assume that the
behavior can be approximated as that of the asymmetric phase on a short time scale. We
therefore suppose that pi = 1 so that only seller i is being selected. In this case, h¯ and x¯
are derived in Eqs. (12) and (14), respectively, whereby we obtain an explicit expression
for Qi at pi = 1. This is denoted as Q0 and represented as dotted horizontal lines in
Fig. 1. Note that Q0 ≈ Qi(τ = 0), because, by assumption, this sellers’ products are
being replaced with fresh ones. However, it takes some finite time to sell the products,
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Figure 1. Q(τ) for (a) g = 0.3 and (b) g = 0.6. The other parameter values are
as given in Sec. 4. The dotted horizontal lines represent Q0, and the existence of the
second crossing point between Q(τ) and Q0 distinguishes the oscillatory phase from
the asymmetric phase (see text).
so Q0 is slightly lower than Qi(τ = 0). As a result, Qi(τ) has a trivial crossing at
τ ∼ O(Npτ0/Na) (Fig. 1). For old products to be as competitive as fresh ones, Qi(τ)
should have another crossing with Q0 at some τ = τ
∗ ≫ O(Npτ0/Na). The shape of the
curves in Fig. 1 suggests that this condition can be rephrased as Qi(τ →∞) = g > Q0.
It is clear that Qi(τ) approaches g as τ grows, so that the critical value gc is a solution
of the following equation:
g
[
1− RhRc γ (R, 1/hc)
]
+ (1− g)
(
1 +
1
R
)−1
= g, (23)
where the left-hand side expresses Q0. We may expect oscillatory behavior when g
exceeds gc. At the same time, we stress that this calculation assumes deterministic
behavior when it comes to buyers, so that the prediction will be the most accurate at
T = 0. Furthermore, the crossing point τ ∗ between Qi(τ) and Q0 provides an estimate
of the half-period of oscillation. It is obtained by numerically solving the following
equation:
g exp
(
−h−1c e
−τ∗/τ1
)
+ (1− g)e−τ
∗/τ1 = Q0. (24)
4. Numerical results
Our numerical simulation shows the existence of the symmetric, oscillatory, and
asymmetric phases as predicted above (Fig. 2). In this simulation, we set the number
of products at each seller as Np = 5× 10
3 and the number of buyers as Na = 10
2. The
typical time interval of a purchase is given as τ0 = 10
−1, and freshness is assumed to
decay with a characteristic time scale τ1 = 20. The price policy is parametrized by a
freshness threshold hc = 5 × 10
−2, and the memory factor is set as α = 0.99. With all
these parameters fixed, we change g and T to locate the phase boundaries. Recall that
the boundary of the symmetric phase is predicted by Eq. (21), whereas the boundary
between the asymmetric and oscillatory phases is predicted to be g = gc, obtained by
solving Eq. (23).
Let us define some numerical quantities to distinguish the three phases. First, the
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t
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t
Figure 2. Time evolution of the probability to choose each seller (red or black line),
started from an initial condition pi = 1/2. As the greed factor g varies at a sufficiently
low temperature T = 2 × 10−2, we observe (a) asymmetric, (b) oscillatory, and (c)
symmetric phases, respectively. (d) With a relatively high temperature (T = 6×10−2),
we can also find asymmetric oscillation.
 0  0.05  0.1  0.15  0.2  0.25  0.3
T
 0
 0.2
 0.4
 0.6
 0.8
 1
g
-1
-0.5
 0
 0.5
 1
m
A
A’
SO
Figure 3. Phase diagram from numerical simulation (see text). For comparison,
the phase boundaries predicted in Eqs. (21) and (23) are represented by the solid
lines. The labels S, A, and O mean the symmetric (m ≈ 0), asymmetric (m > 0),
and oscillatory (m < 0) phases, respectively. In the region labeled as A’, we observe
asymmetric oscillation [Fig. 2(d)].
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Figure 4. τ∗ in Eq. (24) and numerically estimated half-periods, for different values
of g at T = 10−3. The other parameters are the same as used in Sec. 4. Equation (24)
gives a good prediction for the half-periods when g is large enough, but the estimate
becomes inaccurate as g approaches gc ≈ 0.44, which is represented by the dotted
vertical line.
symmetry breaking can be detected by the following:
mA = |〈p1(t)− p2(t)〉t|, (25)
where pi(t) = N
−1
a
∑
n pn,i is the probability to choose seller i at time t and 〈...〉t means
the average over time. Clearly, this quantity will be nonzero only in the asymmetric
phase. To make a distinction between the symmetric and oscillatory phases, we also
measure the following:
mO = 〈|p1(t)− p2(t)|〉t − |〈p1(t)− p2(t)〉t|, (26)
which will be nonzero only in the oscillatory phase. If we combine these two into a
single parameter m = mA −mO, its value will be positive (negative) in the asymmetric
(oscillatory) phase, and close to zero in the symmetric phase. Figure 3 shows the
results: The solid lines are the phase boundaries estimated by Eqs. (21) and (23). The
boundary between the symmetric and asymmetric phases shows an excellent agreement,
especially for g . 0.8. The division between the oscillatory and asymmetric phases is
also consistent with the estimation of gc when T is low. The region A’ is characterized
by asymmetric oscillation, which has not been captured by our analysis. Such a phase
can exist at sufficiently high T , because the unfavored seller sells its old products too
early due to buyers’ stochastic choices.
Finally, we compare τ ∗ with the half-period in the oscillatory phase in Fig. 4. We
choose very low temperature, T = 10−3, because the estimation of τ ∗ can easily be
disturbed by noise. As shown in Fig. 4, the agreement is striking for large g. The
failure at small g is related to one of our fundamental assumptions: Recall that we have
assumed that all the buyers are homogeneous by using a single average buyer in Sec. 3.1.
When g is close to gc ≈ 0.44, this assumption breaks down and the buyers have different
probabilities to choose the sellers. This inhomogeneity dramatically reduces the period
of oscillation.
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5. Discussion
The phase diagram in Fig. 3 shows that the price system indeed restores the symmetry in
a broader range of T as compared to the case without price formally obtained as g = 0.
However, the asymmetric phase can exhibit oscillations when buyers are sensitive to the
price. One might point out that our model bears similarity to the Bertrand duopoly,
in which two sellers sell homogeneous products without any possibility of collusion [20].
The sellers in the Bertrand duopoly compete by setting prices simultaneously, and the
one with a lower price occupies the whole market. If the two sellers charge the same
price, they will evenly share the market. The pure-strategy Nash equilibrium turns out
to be such that both of the sellers set the price equal to marginal cost of production,
which means that they earn nothing from their business [21]. In the Bertrand duopoly,
therefore, the existence of two sellers is already enough to actualize the lowest possible
price. However, one should note its underlying assumption that a single seller can cover
the whole market. If this is not the case, e.g., due to limited capacity of production,
we encounter the Edgeworth paradox, which means that this game has no pure-strategy
Nash equilibrium, hence no stationary price. For example, one of the two firms can make
profits by deviating from the marginal cost, because the other firm alone cannot meet
the demand. Although a mixed strategy can constitute a Nash equilibrium [22, 23], it
is hardly feasible in practice and one would instead observe the Edgeworth price cycle
(Reference [20] also points out that the capacity constraint may not be a necessary
condition for the cycle). The Edgeworth paradox suggests that the price mechanism
can introduce instabilities. However, the cycle is actually a pseudo-dynamic process in
the sense that it originates from an equilibrium concept. In contrast, our oscillatory
phase is born out of dynamical rules without any consideration of strategic equilibrium.
To consider some strategic aspects in our model, let us suppose that the variables
T and g characterizing buyers are just given parameters when viewed from the sellers.
The sellers can instead decide hc to control the price policy, and the symmetry between
the sellers suggests that they will end up with the same hc. The critical temperature
Tc in Eq. (21) depends on hc unless g = 0. For example, if hc → 0, the price will
become insensitive to freshness. It implies that F(R, p0, hc) vanishes in Eq. (21) so that
the phase boundary of the symmetric phase in Fig. 3 will converge to a line connecting
(Tc(0), 0) and (0, 1) on the (T, g) plane. In a price war, the sellers will increase hc to
lower the average price, but the possible range of hc must be bounded due to the cost
of production. We may regard our hc in the previous sections as the highest possible
one determined by such a competitive process. Differently from the Bertrand duopoly,
however, the sellers do not always divide the market half and half, when the mechanism
of Lambert et al. is at work [15]: The market of perishable goods tends to become
monopolistic, especially when the purchasing behavior is deterministic with low T . Our
point is that this tendency is nevertheless weakened by the price sensitivity, either by
extending the symmetric phase, or by restoring the symmetry over a long period in the
oscillatory phase.
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6. Summary
To summarize, we have incorporated a simple price system coupled with freshness into
the duopoly model suggested by Lambert et al. In addition to the effective temperature
T to control the randomness in purchasing behavior, we have introduced the greed
parameter g to determine the sensitivity of satisfaction to the price. We have identified
the symmetric, asymmetric, and oscillatory phases and estimated their boundaries in
the (T, g) plane. Our numerical simulations show nice agreements with our analytic
results. Based on our analysis, we conclude that the price system resists the tendency
to a monopoly: On one hand, it lowers the critical temperature Tc below which the
symmetric phase becomes unstable. On the other hand, the market with high g can
keep oscillating without settling on a single seller, preserving the symmetry in a time-
averaged sense.
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